



Righting Categorical Wrongs: A Holistic 
Solution to Rule 8(a)’s Same-or-Similar-
Character Prong 
Matthew Deates† 
More than half of federal criminal defendants are charged with multiple of-
fenses in a single indictment. These defendants are more likely to be convicted on 
at least one charge than defendants who receive separate trials for each charge. 
Joinder has been both lauded for increasing the efficiency of the federal criminal 
justice system and criticized for unfairly prejudicing criminal defendants. Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 8(a) and 14 govern the joinder of offenses in the fed-
eral system. Rule 8(a) permits offenses of the “same or similar character” to be 
joined against a single defendant while Rule 14 allows district courts to sever the 
offenses if joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant.” The circuit courts have taken 
divergent views of when offenses are of the “same or similar character” and thus 
properly joined together. Two general approaches have emerged among the cir-
cuits, with roughly half taking a categorical approach to Rule 8(a)’s same-or-
similar-character prong, which requires offenses to be simply of “like class.” The 
remaining circuits, on the other hand, employ a holistic approach. These courts 
apply multifactored tests to examine the charges for similarity, including whether 
the offenses are connected by time or evidence and involve similar statutory ele-
ments or victims. The holistic approach’s more rigorous analysis under the same-
or-similar-character prong results in fewer combinations of offenses joined. 
This Comment resolves the circuit split over the same-or-similar-character 
prong by examining the history, functions, and purposes of Rules 8(a) and 14. It 
argues that the holistic approach is superior to the categorical, as it better fulfills 
the intent of the rules’ drafters, better accounts for the procedural and practical re-
alities of the rules, and better meets joinder’s efficiency goals while minimizing its 
risk of prejudice. 
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A criminal defendant is charged with wire fraud in violation 
of 18 USC § 1343. As he and his defense attorney prepare for 
trial, the US Attorney’s Office notifies him that there is reason 
to believe he has previously committed bankruptcy fraud in vio-
lation of 18 USC § 152. The prosecution joins the two charges in 
a single superseding indictment. The alleged crimes occurred 
three years apart in different cities, under different circum-
stances, and involved different victims; in fact, they arise from 
distinct statutory provisions and must be proved by different el-
ements. Despite their striking dissimilarity, the defendant may 
be forced to defend against the two charges in a single criminal 
proceeding. 
Rules 8(a) and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (FRCrP) govern the joinder of offenses. One prong of 
Rule 8(a) authorizes the joinder of two or more charges in a sin-
gle indictment if they are of the “same or similar character.”1 
What it means for offenses to be of the “same or similar charac-
ter” has divided the US courts of appeals. If the criminal de-
fendant is charged in a circuit that uses a strictly categorical 
approach, which requires that offenses only be of “like class,” 
then factually dissimilar offenses, as in the example above, may 
be charged together.2 By contrast, if the criminal defendant is 
 
 1 See FRCrP 8(a). 
 2 See, for example, United States v Coleman, 22 F3d 126, 133 (7th Cir 1994) 
(“Simply put, if offenses are of like class, although not connected temporally or evi-
dentially, the requisites of proper joinder should be satisfied so far as Rule 8(a) is 
concerned.”). 
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charged in a circuit with a holistic approach to Rule 8(a)’s same-
or-similar-character prong, the government must show that the 
alleged offenses are more than just of “like class.” These circuits 
rely on additional considerations to determine whether offenses 
are of the “same or similar character,” including any evidentiary 
and temporal overlap between the two offenses, or whether the 
offenses are proven by analogous statutory elements, share a 
modus operandi, occurred in similar locations, or involve similar 
victims.3 All else equal, the holistic-approach circuits undertake 
a more fact-intensive analysis into whether offenses are of the 
“same or similar character,” which results in fewer combinations 
of offenses joined than under the categorical approach.4 
Given that joinder may substantially and unfairly prejudice 
defendants, the circuit split on the same-or-similar-character 
prong is troubling.5 In a joint trial on separate offenses, the jury 
may struggle to separate the bodies of evidence relating to dif-
ferent crimes and may draw impermissible inferences about the 
defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit crime. The 
defendant also may be burdened with having to present multi-
ple—and perhaps inconsistent—defenses at once.6 Furthermore, 
defendants facing multiple charges are significantly more likely 
to be convicted on at least one count at trial than defendants fac-
ing only one charge.7 
The circuit split over Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character 
prong is also concerning in light of joinder’s rationale: increasing 
judicial and prosecutorial efficiency.8 Joinder is often thought to 
be more efficient because a single trial on multiple offenses elim-
inates the need to empanel two juries, recall witnesses, and 
 
 3 See, for example, United States v Jawara, 462 F3d 1173, 1185 (9th Cir 2006), 
amended, 474 F3d 565, 578 (9th Cir 2007). 
 4 See Part II.C. 
 5 See, for example, Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172, 180 (1997) (“The term 
‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly 
relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from 
proof specific to the offense charged.”). 
 6 See Wayne R. LaFave, et al, 5 Criminal Procedure § 17.1(b) at 6–10 (West 
4th ed 2015). 
 7 See Andrew D. Leipold and Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of Joinder and 
Severance on Federal Criminal Cases: An Empirical Study, 59 Vand L Rev 349, 367 
(2006); James Farrin, Note, Rethinking Criminal Joinder: An Analysis of the Empirical 
Research and Its Implications for Justice, 52 L & Contemp Probs 325, 332 (Autumn 
1989) (“The empirical data unequivocally show that the probability of a defendant being 
convicted significantly increases if offenses are joined rather than tried separately.”). 
 8 See Bruton v United States, 391 US 123, 134 (1968). 
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spend time presenting the same evidence twice.9 In practice, 
however, these benefits are often not fully realized in cases in 
which offenses are categorically joined under the same-or-
similar-character prong. In particular, offenses joined merely 
because they are of “like class” may be proved with completely 
separate evidence and witnesses, invalidating much of joinder’s 
efficiency justification. And the increased threat of prejudice un-
der these circumstances may outweigh any legitimate purpose 
for the joinder. Holistic-approach circuits, on the other hand, 
better achieve efficient joinder by requiring that offenses be 
more closely connected, whether by evidence, time, statutory el-
ements, or modus operandi. And when joined offenses are more 
closely connected, the prejudices resulting from joinder are more 
likely justified by the efficiency gains in holding a single trial. 
Regardless of the court’s approach to Rule 8(a), a defendant 
facing multiple charges may make an application under Rule 14 
to sever the charges into separate criminal proceedings.10 To ob-
tain Rule 14 severance, the defendant must show that joinder 
would cause him prejudice.11 If he meets this requirement, 
Rule 14 allows district courts to sever charges properly joined 
under Rule 8(a). As a result, the categorical-approach courts be-
lieve the availability of Rule 14 severance reinforces their more 
permissive interpretation of Rule 8(a).12 
But this belief may not be rooted in the realities of Rule 14 
severance. The procedural and practical attributes of Rule 14 
make it an uncertain remedy against joinder’s prejudice. Not on-
ly do district-court judges enjoy significant discretion in deciding 
whether there is enough prejudice to warrant severance, but 
even if such prejudice exists, judges may choose alternative 
remedies to severance, such as instructing the jury to not use ev-
idence of one charge to convict on the other.13 The holistic-
approach courts, on the other hand, acknowledge Rule 14’s 
 
 9 See id. 
 10 See FRCrP 14(a) (“If the joinder of offenses . . . appears to prejudice a defendant 
. . . the court may order separate trials of counts.”). 
 11 See FRCrP 14(a). 
 12 See, for example, Coleman, 22 F3d at 134 (explaining that a categorical approach 
to the same-or-similar-character prong “makes sense” in light of Rule 14’s authority “for 
monitoring the continued appropriateness of a joint trial as proceedings go forward”). 
 13 See id at 134 n 11 (noting that Rule 14 authorizes courts to provide “whatever 
other relief justice requires”). 
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inherent limitations and understand that severance may not be 
available even in the face of joinder’s prejudice.14 
This Comment analyzes the current circuit split on when 
two or more offenses are of the “same or similar character” un-
der Rule 8(a). Part I provides background on joinder of offenses 
in the federal system, its controversial nature, and its effect on 
criminal trials. Part I also discusses the federal rules that gov-
ern joinder and severance—their origin and their application 
today. Part II outlines the variety of approaches taken by the 
circuit courts to joinder under Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-
character prong and examines the underlying motivations and 
assumptions driving the two most disparate approaches: those of 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. It also compares how these two 
circuits and their respective district courts have subsequently 
treated joinder under the same-or-similar-character prong, and 
it questions whether their approaches adequately address the 
danger of prejudice that is unjustified by any potential efficiency 
gains. Finally, Part III offers a solution to the circuit split, argu-
ing that courts should abandon the categorical approach in favor 
of the holistic. The categorical-approach courts have failed to 
comply with the original understanding of the federal rules on 
joinder because their approach leads to additional unjustified 
and unfair prejudice toward defendants. The holistic approach, 
in contrast, more fully embodies the principles incorporated in-
to the federal rules and adequately tempers the risks of preju-
dice while allowing offenses to be joined when efficiencies can 
be attained. 
I.  JOINDER OF OFFENSES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
Joinder of offenses is a contentious mechanism in the feder-
al criminal justice system, justified primarily by the judicial and 
prosecutorial efficiencies it can afford. Having a single trial on 
multiple charges saves limited time and resources. Yet joinder 
may pose a substantial risk of unfair prejudice toward defend-
ants. Courts applying the rules on joinder have struggled to en-
sure that joinder’s efficiency benefits can be realized while min-
imizing its risk of unfair prejudice. 
 
 14 See, for example, Jawara, 474 F3d at 573 (adopting a holistic approach to the 
same-or-similar-character prong and cautioning that “Rule 14 should not be viewed as a 
backstop or substitute for the initial analysis required under Rule 8(a)”). 
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Part I.A discusses the benefits and costs of joinder in federal 
prosecutions and highlights the general controversy surrounding 
its use. Part I.B introduces the federal rules governing joinder of 
offenses and explains these rules’ origins before focusing on the 
most controversial basis for joinder: Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-
character prong. 
A. Joinder’s Controversy 
Joinder has been lauded for fostering trial efficiency and ju-
dicial and prosecutorial economy by avoiding “expensive and 
duplicative multiple trials.”15 The Supreme Court has heralded 
joinder’s ability to “conserve [government] funds, diminish in-
convenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid de-
lays in bringing those accused of crime to trial.”16 Under some 
circumstances, the criminal defendant himself may prefer join-
der to avoid the “harassment, delay, trauma, and expense of 
multiple prosecutions.”17 A single prosecution of multiple offens-
es also may allow for concurrent sentencing.18 
Despite these advantages, joint trials present significant 
risks of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Rather than properly 
weighing the evidence for each charge, the jury may convict 
based on the accumulation of evidence specific to each charge or 
on the impermissible inference of a general criminal disposi-
tion.19 Joinder may also disadvantage defendants who wish to 
testify regarding one charge but not the other or who need to 
simultaneously present multiple—and perhaps inconsistent—
defenses.20 
 
 15 United States v Coleman, 22 F3d 126, 132 (7th Cir 1994), citing United States v 
Archer, 843 F2d 1019, 1021 (7th Cir 1988), and United States v L’Allier, 838 F2d 234, 
240 (7th Cir 1988). See also United States v Werner, 620 F2d 922, 928–29 (2d Cir 1980); 
Robert O. Dawson, Joint Trials of Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of 
Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 Mich L Rev 1379, 1381–97 (1979). 
 16 Bruton v United States, 391 US 123, 134 (1968). 
 17 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Commentary on § 13-2.1 (ABA 2d ed 1980). 
 18 See 18 USC § 3584 (“If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defend-
ant at the same time . . . the terms may run concurrently.”). See also United States v 
Matera, 489 F3d 115, 124 (2d Cir 2007) (explaining that § 3584 grants the district-court 
judge “discretion to impose a concurrent, partially concurrent, or consecutive sentence”). 
 19 See Coleman, 22 F3d at 132, citing Drew v United States, 331 F2d 85, 88 (DC Cir 
1964). See also United States v Lane, 474 US 438, 463 (1986) (Brennan concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that it is “quite easy for the jury to be preju-
diced by evidence of other crimes”). 
 20 See LaFave, et al, 5 Criminal Procedure § 17.1(b) at 9 (cited in note 6). 
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Joinder is a common tactic in the federal system: a study of 
all federal criminal defendants from 1999 through 2003 found 
that slightly more than half were charged with two or more of-
fenses in a single indictment.21 Strikingly, the study found a 
nine-point disparity in trial conviction rates of those charged 
with single and joined offenses: the conviction rate for defend-
ants charged with one offense was 76 percent, whereas the con-
viction rate for defendants with joined offenses was 85 percent.22 
Though the study did not examine the precise cause for this sig-
nificant discrepancy, it is likely that jury confusion regarding 
the evidence on separate but similar charges and prejudice re-
sulting from the sheer volume of evidence against the defend-
ants played a role.23 For example, the jury might “be so im-
pressed with the evidence on counts one and two that it fails to 
notice that there was insufficient evidence on the very-similar 
count three.”24 
B. The Rules Governing Joinder of Offenses 
Rules 8(a) and 14 of the FRCrP govern the joinder of offens-
es in the federal system. Adopted in 1944, the rules derive from 
the 1853 federal statute that had previously controlled joinder.25 
The drafters of Rules 8(a) and 14 explained that the rules are a 
“restatement” of the 1853 statute.26 Consequently, an under-
standing of this statute and its application is essential to apply-
ing the current rules. Part I.B.1 explains the law that governed 
federal joinder prior to the adoption of Rules 8(a) and 14. 
Part I.B.2 discusses how joinder operates today under the rules. 
 
 21 See Leipold and Abbasi, 59 Vand L Rev at 363–64 (cited in note 7). 
 22 Id at 383. The authors controlled for whether the factfinder was a judge or the 
jury, the seriousness of the crime, the type of crime, the type of lawyer, and the geogra-
phy. See id at 373–83. 
 23 See id at 355–56. 
 24 Id at 356. 
 25 See Act of Feb 26, 1853, 10 Stat 161, 162, codified at 18 USC § 557 (1940), re-
pealed by Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat 683, 830, 832. See also Kevin P. Hein, Joinder 
and Severance, 30 Am Crim L Rev 1139, 1140 (1993). 
 26 See FRCrP 8(a), Advisory Committee Note to the 1944 Rule (“This rule is sub-
stantially a restatement of existing law, 18 U.S.C. [former] 557.”) (alteration in original); 
FRCrP 14, Advisory Committee Note to the 1944 Rule (“This rule is a restatement of ex-
isting law under which severance and other similar relief is entirely in the discretion of 
the court.”), citing generally Pointer v United States, 151 US 396 (1894), Pierce v United 
States, 160 US 355 (1896), United States v Ball, 163 US 662 (1896), and Stilson v United 
States, 250 US 583 (1919). 
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1. Joinder law before 1944. 
Before the adoption of Rules 8(a) and 14 in 1944, a federal 
statute permitted the joinder of offenses in federal prosecu-
tions.27 When the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the 
statute, it recognized the controversial nature of joinder and its 
significant risks of prejudice toward criminal defendants. The 
Court articulated a general presumption against the joinder of 
offenses and established that courts should not sustain instanc-
es of joinder that are unfairly prejudicial toward the defendant. 
To minimize the risk of prejudice, the Court held that the former 
joinder statute did not permit the government to join wholly un-
related offenses sharing no significant connection. That statute, 
originally passed in 1853, provided in part: 
Whenever there are . . . several charges against any person 
. . . for the same act or transaction, or for two or more acts 
or transactions connected together, or for two or more acts 
or transactions of the same class of crimes or offences which 
may be properly joined, instead of having several indict-
ments, the whole may be joined in one indictment in sepa-
rate counts.28 
Though the statute seemed to broadly allow charges “of the 
same class of crimes or offences” joined in one indictment, the 
Court required a close factual and evidentiary connection be-
tween the alleged crimes. When it first examined the federal 
joinder statute in Pointer v United States,29 the Court considered 
whether it allowed the Government to join two murder charges 
against a single defendant. The Government alleged the defend-
ant had killed two people “on the same day, in the same county 
and district, and with the same kind of instrument.”30 But be-
cause the alleged murders were entirely separate acts, the Court 
first concluded that the charges were neither “the result of one 
transaction” nor “connected together” within the meaning of the 
statute.31 
 
 27 Act of Feb 26, 1853, 10 Stat at 162. 
 28 Act of Feb 26, 1853, 10 Stat at 162. Rule 8(a)’s drafters largely preserved this 
structure, allowing joinder when the offenses are “based on the same act or transaction,” 
are “connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan,” or are of the “same 
or similar character.” FRCrP 8(a). 
 29 151 US 396 (1894). 
 30 Id at 403. 
 31 Id at 400. 
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The Pointer Court next considered whether the two charges 
could be joined under the statute as being of “the same class of 
crimes.”32 It explained that, rather than mandating joinder in 
every case in which offenses are of “the same class,” the 1853 
statute allowed courts “to determine whether, in a given case, a 
joinder of two or more offences . . . is consistent with the settled 
principles of criminal law.”33 The Court looked to English and 
American sources for recognition of certain “settled principles” 
to guide courts’ joinder analyses and noted a general presump-
tion against joinder: “[U]sually an indictment should not include 
more than one felony.”34 That said, the Court conceded joinder 
“of different felonies, at least of the same class or grade, and 
subject to the same punishment, is not necessarily fatal to the 
indictment.”35 Yet even when joinder is allowed, courts “must not 
permit the defendant to be embarrassed in his defence.”36 Courts 
should sever charges “when it appears from the indictment, or 
from the evidence,” that the “substantial rights of the accused 
may be prejudiced” by joinder.37 
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court noted that the 
two murders were so closely related “in respect of time, place, 
and occasion, that it was difficult, if not impossible, to separate 
the proof of one charge from the proof of the other.”38 Thus, the 
Court decided the settled principles of criminal law allowed 
joinder: “the accused was not confounded in his defense” and 
“his substantial rights were not prejudiced” by joinder of the 
charges.39 
Shortly after deciding Pointer, the Court further refined its 
understanding of the 1853 joinder statute in McElroy v United 
States.40 The prosecution in McElroy charged the defendant with 
two counts of assault with intent to kill and two counts of arson, 
which derived from two separate incidents two weeks apart.41 
Echoing Pointer, the Court explained that joinder “has been con-
sidered so objectionable as tending to confound the accused in 
 
 32 Id. 
 33 Pointer, 151 US at 400. 
 34 Id at 403. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Pointer, 151 US at 403. 
 38 Id at 404. 
 39 Id. 
 40 164 US 76 (1896). 
 41 Id at 76–77. 
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his defence”42 and concluded that “we do not think the statute 
authorizes the joinder of distinct felonies, not provable by the 
same evidence and in no sense resulting from the same series of 
acts.”43 
Reaching the merits of the case, the Court found the offens-
es could not be joined under the statute; the offenses were “sepa-
rate and distinct, complete in themselves and independent of 
each other, committed at different times and not provable by the 
same evidence.”44 Although the charges were “of the same class 
of crimes,”45 the Court required a close temporal, factual, and ev-
identiary connection before allowing joinder. After McElroy, the 
federal courts followed this lead.46 
2. FRCrP 8(a) and 14. 
Since 1944, FRCrP 8(a) and 14 have regulated the joinder of 
federal offenses. As these rules restate the previous law on join-
der, the principles announced in Pointer and McElroy should 
continue to inform their application today. Indeed, courts relied 
on these decisions when applying Rules 8(a) and 14 shortly after 
their adoption.47 
Rule 8(a) allows for the joinder of multiple offenses—
“whether felonies or misdemeanors or both”—against an indi-
vidual defendant if one of three conditions is satisfied: the of-
fenses charged must be either (1) “of the same or similar charac-
ter,” (2) “based on the same act or transaction,” or (3) “connected 
 
 42 Id at 80. 
 43 Id. 
 44 McElroy, 164 US at 79–80. 
 45 Id at 80. 
 46 See, for example, Williams v United States, 168 US 382, 390–91 (1897) (holding 
that the 1853 statute permitted the joinder of two separate extortion charges because 
“the offenses charged were of the same kind, were provable by the same kind of evidence, 
and could be tried together without embarrassing the accused in making his defense”); 
Kidwell v United States, 38 App DC 566, 570 (1912) (holding that the Government had 
misjoined two charges of carnal knowledge that stemmed from separate incidents more 
than six months apart and were not dependent on the same evidence). 
 47 See, for example, United States v Graci, 504 F2d 411, 413 (3d Cir 1974) (“The 
Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rule[ ] 8 . . . indicate that [it is] substantially [a] 
restatement[ ] of existing law. Thus the construction . . . announced in McElroy . . . still 
applies.”); United States v Schennault, 201 F2d 1, 4 (7th Cir 1952) (“As the advisory 
committee on rules pointed out, rules 8 and 14 [ ] are mere restatements of existing law, 
and owe their origin to the Act of February 26, 1853. . . . Hence it is altogether proper in 
discussing these rules to cite cases decided under said statute.”). See also King v United 
States, 355 F2d 700, 703 (1st Cir 1966); Drew, 331 F2d at 88–89. 
2018] Righting Categorical Wrongs 837 
 
with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.”48 These 
three prongs are similar to the language of the former federal 
joinder statute.49 
Even if the offenses are properly joined under Rule 8(a), the 
trial judge may sever the charges and order separate trials pur-
suant to Rule 14, which provides: “If the joinder of offenses . . . 
appears to prejudice a defendant or the government, the court 
may order separate trials of counts . . . or provide any other re-
lief justice requires.”50 
a) Rule 8(a).  Whether joinder is proper under Rule 8(a) is 
a question of law decided by the district-court judge during the 
case’s pretrial proceedings.51 Defendants charged with multiple 
offenses in a single indictment may bring motions to sever pur-
suant to Rule 8(a), arguing that none of the rule’s three bases for 
joinder applies. The district-court judge must make the Rule 8(a) 
determination solely from information provided by the 
Government in the indictment.52 It is therefore incumbent upon 
the prosecution to ensure that the indictment alleges sufficient 
facts for the judge to find joinder proper. If offenses are mis-
joined under Rule 8(a), such that none of the three prongs ap-
plies, the offenses must be severed as a matter of law. Whether 
offenses are properly joined under Rule 8(a) is reviewed de novo 
by the appellate courts.53 
Of Rule 8(a)’s three bases for joinder, the same-or-similar-
character prong is the most amorphous and controversial.54 Ac-
cording to Professor Lester Orfield, the drafters of Rule 8(a) sub-
stituted “character” for the word “class” (which was used in the 
1853 joinder statute) because some courts had interpreted 
“class” to mean “grade” rather than “nature.”55 Presumably the 
 
 48 FRCrP 8(a). 
 49 See text accompanying note 27. 
 50 FRCrP 14(a). 
 51 See Coleman, 22 F3d at 134; United States v Jawara, 462 F3d 1173, 1179 (9th 
Cir 2006), amended, 474 F3d 565, 572–73 (9th Cir 2007) (explaining that the validity of 
joinder under Rule 8(a) is “discern[ed] from the face of the indictment”), citing United 
States v Terry, 911 F2d 272, 276–77 (9th Cir 1990). 
 52 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 572, quoting Terry, 911 F2d at 276; United States v 
Barsoum, 763 F3d 1321, 1337 (11th Cir 2014); United States v Berg, 714 F3d 490, 495 
(7th Cir 2013), quoting United States v Lanas, 324 F3d 894, 899 (7th Cir 2003). 
 53 See United States v Gooch, 665 F3d 1318, 1325 (DC Cir 2012); Jawara, 474 F3d 
at 572, citing Terry, 911 F2d at 276. 
 54 See Charles A. Wright, et al, 1A Federal Practice and Procedure § 143 at 52–53 
(West 2016); Hein, 30 Am Crim L Rev at 1140 n 8 (cited in note 25). 
 55 See Lester B. Orfield, Joinder in Federal Criminal Procedure, 26 FRD 23, 27 (1961). 
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drafters wanted courts to focus on the factual circumstances of 
each offense rather than their degree or grading as either mis-
demeanor or felony. Despite this change, courts have struggled 
to determine what it means for offenses to be of the “same or 
similar character.” In these cases, “line drawing between per-
missible and improper joinder sometimes becomes imprecise and 
the standards applied confusing.”56 
In addition to being vague, the same-or-similar-character 
prong may fail to advance joinder’s efficiency justifications while 
elevating “the risk of unnecessary unfairness infiltrating the 
joint trial.”57 Strong evidence of one crime may cause the jury to 
accept weaker evidence of similar crimes, violating the spirit of 
the rule forbidding character or propensity evidence.58 And un-
like joinder under Rule 8(a)’s other two prongs, offenses of the 
“same or similar character” might “involve different times, sepa-
rate locations, and distinct sets of witnesses and victims.”59 Con-
sequently, there might be “no comparable saving of trial time”60 
as “separate trials would not involve substantial duplication of 
evidence, repeated burdens on witnesses and victims, and in-
creased drain upon prosecutorial and judicial resources.”61 
b) Rule 14.  Unlike Rule 8(a), Rule 14 allows courts to 
sever offenses at any time during criminal proceedings if joinder 
appears to prejudice the defendant or government.62 Under 
Rule 14, the trial judge may even sever offenses properly joined 
 
 56 United States v Buchanan, 930 F Supp 657, 662 (D Mass 1996). 
 57 Coleman, 22 F3d at 134. See also United States v Muniz, 1 F3d 1018, 1023 
(10th Cir 1993). 
 58 See FRE 404(b)(1). 
 59 LaFave, et al, 5 Criminal Procedure § 17.1(b) at 9 (cited in note 6). 
 60 Coleman, 22 F3d at 134, quoting James W. Moore, 8 Moore’s Federal Practice 
§ 8.05[4] at 8-23 to -24 (Matthew Bender 2d ed 1991). 
 61 LaFave, et al, 5 Criminal Procedure § 17.1(b) at 9 (cited in note 6), quoting 2 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Commentary on § 13-2.1 (cited in note 17). See also 
United States v Randazzo, 80 F3d 623, 627 (1st Cir 1996) (“It is obvious why Congress 
provided for joinder of counts that grow out of related transactions . . . the reason for al-
lowing joinder of offenses having ‘the same or similar character’ is less clear.”); United 
States v Halper, 590 F2d 422, 430 (2d Cir 1978) (“When all that can be said of two sepa-
rate offenses is that they are of the ‘same or similar character,’ the customary justifica-
tions for joinder (efficiency and economy) largely disappear. . . . At the same time, the 
risk to the defendant in such circumstances is considerable.”); Note, Joint and Single 
Trials under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 Yale L J 553, 
560 (1965) (recommending “abolition of joinder of similar offenses under Rule 8” given 
the “lack of utility” and risk of prejudice to the defendant). 
 62 See Schaffer v United States, 362 US 511, 516 (1960) (“[T]he trial judge has a 
continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear.”). 
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under Rule 8(a).63 The Rule 14 severance decision is not confined 
to the indictment’s contents; the trial judge may rely on any in-
formation, including evidence presented at trial, when deciding 
whether to sever charges under the rule.64 
Rule 14 is important for its potential to resolve whatever 
prejudices might arise from Rule 8(a) joinder. Once Rule 8(a)’s 
requirements for joinder are satisfied, severance is entirely con-
trolled by Rule 14.65 Some courts have construed Rule 8(a) more 
leniently, knowing that any prejudice stemming from joinder 
can theoretically be dealt with at a later time on a Rule 14 sev-
erance motion.66 
Yet there are several reasons that, compared to the 
Rule 8(a) analysis, Rule 14 is a weak safeguard against unfair 
prejudice. For starters, obtaining severance under Rule 14 is of-
ten difficult. Courts generally require defendants to show a 
high degree of prejudice before severing charges under the 
rule.67 The Seventh Circuit, for example, requires defendants 
seeking Rule 14 severance to establish that they “could not 
have a fair trial without severance.”68 Likewise, district courts 
in the Fifth Circuit will grant severance only in cases of “com-
pelling prejudice.”69 
Even if the defendant meets this heavy burden, Rule 14 
does not mandate severance; instead, “it leaves the tailoring of 
the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court’s sound dis-
cretion.”70 Rather than ordering separate trials in the face of 
substantial prejudice, a trial judge could choose to simply in-
struct the jury on the dangers of confusing the evidence relating 
to the separate charges. And unlike a district court’s Rule 8(a) 
decision, which is reviewed de novo, appellate courts defer to a 
district court’s Rule 14 decision and will reverse only if there is a 
 
 63 See id at 515–16. 
 64 See id. 
 65 See, for example, Lane, 474 US at 447, citing Schaffer, 362 US at 515–16. 
 66 See, for example, Randazzo, 80 F3d at 627 (“Rule 8(a)’s joinder provision is gen-
erously construed in favor of joinder . . . in part because [Rule] 14 provides a separate 
layer of protection where it is most needed.”); Coleman, 22 F3d at 134. 
 67 See Zafiro v United States, 506 US 534, 539 (1993) (“When the risk of prejudice 
is high, a district court is more likely to determine that separate trials are necessary.”). 
 68 United States v Hughes, 310 F3d 557, 563 (7th Cir 2002), quoting United States v 
Mohammad, 53 F3d 1426, 1431 (7th Cir 1995). 
 69 United States v Rice, 607 F3d 133, 142 (5th Cir 2010). 
 70 Zafiro, 506 US at 538–39, citing Lane, 474 US at 438, 449 n 12. See also Opper v 
United States, 348 US 84, 95 (1954). 
840 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:827 
 
clear abuse of discretion.71 For example, to successfully appeal a 
district court’s denial of Rule 14 severance in the Seventh 
Circuit, “the defendant bears an extremely difficult burden of 
showing . . . that the district court abused its discretion.”72 Simi-
larly, the Ninth Circuit will not reverse a district court’s Rule 14 
decision unless the defendant shows that “a joint trial was so 
manifestly prejudicial as to require the trial judge to exercise his 
discretion in but one way, by ordering a separate trial.”73 The 
Second Circuit has put it more bluntly: “A district court’s deci-
sion to deny severance is virtually unreviewable and will be 
overturned only if a defendant can demonstrate prejudice so 
severe that his conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice 
and that the denial of his motion constituted an abuse of dis-
cretion.”74 Consequently, a district court’s severance decision 
under Rule 14 is far less likely to be reversed than its Rule 8(a) 
decision. 
Besides Rule 14’s exacting severance standards and defer-
ential appellate review, certain practicalities make it difficult to 
obtain separate trials on joined offenses. As James Farrin notes, 
“there is never a good time to claim unfair joinder. Before trial, 
such a claim may seem speculative, during the trial, disruptive, 
and after the trial, harmless error.”75 The fallacy of sunk costs76 
may explain the hesitancy of district-court judges to sever of-
fenses in the middle of trial, even if it is clear the defendant is 
substantially prejudiced by the joinder, having already invested 
time and resources into a lengthy criminal proceeding, including 
indictment, filing of pretrial motions, jury selection, and evi-
dence presentment. This is unfortunate, as Rule 14 plainly al-
lows for severance in the face of prejudice arising at any point in 
 
 71 See Lane, 474 US at 449 n 12 (“Rule 14’s concern is to provide the trial court 
with some flexibility when a joint trial may appear to risk prejudice to a party; review of 
that decision is for an abuse of discretion.”). 
 72 United States v Moya-Gomez, 860 F2d 706, 754 (7th Cir 1988) (emphasis added). 
This is the standard that the Seventh Circuit applied before its decision in Coleman, 
which relaxed the standard. See text accompanying notes 98–99. 
 73 United States v Sullivan, 522 F3d 967, 981 (9th Cir 2008) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 74 United States v Fazio, 770 F3d 160, 165–66 (2d Cir 2014) (emphasis added and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 75 Farrin, Note, 52 L & Contemp Probs at 334 (cited in note 7). See also Dawson, 77 
Mich L Rev at 1410 (cited in note 15). 
 76 For a discussion of sunk-cost effects on decisionmaking, see generally Ross 
B. Steinman and Emily Jacobs, Sunk Cost Effects on Consumer Choice, 4 Bus Mgmt 
Dynamics 25 (May 2015). 
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the criminal proceeding—even during trial. This, together with 
the great burden that district courts impose on defendants seek-
ing severance under Rule 14 and the discrepancy in appellate 
review, renders Rule 14 a shaky defense against joinder’s risks. 
II.  CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHEN ARE TWO OR MORE OFFENSES OF THE 
“SAME OR SIMILAR CHARACTER” TO BE JOINED UNDER RULE 8(A)? 
Given the controversial nature of joinder in general and 
Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong in particular, it is 
especially troubling that for several decades the circuit courts 
have adopted disparate approaches to determine whether of-
fenses are of the “same or similar character” and, therefore, 
properly joined under Rule 8(a). Two general approaches have 
developed: one categorical and one holistic. Part II.A examines 
the categorical approach while Part II.B discusses the holistic. 
Part II.C compares how these distinct approaches to the same-
or-similar-character prong work in practice. Part II.D then con-
siders how courts operating under the two regimes treat sever-
ance under Rule 14 and questions whether their treatment 
accounts for joinder’s danger of unjustified prejudice. 
A. The Categorical Approach 
Though not identical in form, the Second,77 Seventh,78 and 
Eleventh79 Circuits take a categorical view of Rule 8(a)’s same-
or-similar-character prong. These circuits permit more combina-
tions of offenses to be joined in one indictment, even without ev-
identiary or temporal connections between the charges.80 These 
courts share a broad understanding of when offenses are of the 
 
 77 See, for example, United States v Werner, 620 F2d 922, 926 (2d Cir 1980) (decid-
ing that “Rule 8(a) is not limited to crimes of the ‘same’ character but also covers those of 
‘similar’ character, which means ‘[n]early corresponding; resembling in many respects; 
somewhat alike; having a general likeness’”) (alteration in original); United States v 
Rivera, 546 F3d 245, 253 (2d Cir 2008) (expounding on Werner and holding that 
“[s]imilar” charges include those that are “somewhat alike,” or share “a general like-
ness”). 
 78 See, for example, United States v Coleman, 22 F3d 126, 134 (7th Cir 1994). 
 79 See, for example, United States v Hersh, 297 F3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir 2002) 
(holding that the same-or-similar-character prong requires only that “the offenses . . . be 
similar in category, not in evidence”). 
 80 See Part II.C. 
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“same or similar character” and, depending on the degree of 
generality, may join seemingly unrelated offenses.81 
The Seventh Circuit’s landmark decision in United States v 
Coleman82 most fully articulated the categorical approach to 
Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong and provided nu-
merous arguments against the holistic alternative. In that case, 
the Government charged the defendant with four counts of un-
lawful possession of a firearm under 18 USC § 922(g)(1).83 
Although the counts stemmed from four separate incidents oc-
curring in separate locations over a span greater than two 
years,84 the court found them properly joined under the same-or-
similar-character prong.85 
The Coleman court concluded: “[I]f offenses are of like class, 
although not connected temporally or evidentially, the requisites 
of proper joinder should be satisfied so far as Rule 8(a) is con-
cerned.”86 The rule’s plain language, the court reasoned, serves 
as a “clear directive to compare the offenses charged for categor-
ical, not evidentiary, similarities.”87 Requiring that offenses be of 
“like class” does not mean that they derive from the same stat-
ute, either.88 Rather, their “correspondence in type is obviously 
central to their proper joinder.”89 Similarity of character also 
“does not significantly depend on [the] separation in time” be-
tween two offenses: “Two armored car robberies committed 
 
 81 The Ninth Circuit has criticized the holistic approach as allowing joinder when 
some “general thematic commonality” among the charges can be adduced. See United 
States v Jawara, 462 F3d 1173, 1185 (9th Cir 2006), amended, 474 F3d 565, 579 (9th Cir 
2007). For example, the situation of “a pharmacist who sells, over the counter, unlawful 
amounts of products containing pseudoephedrine and then, some years later, buys co-
caine from a government informant” involves a common theme of drugs, yet that might 
not make the offenses of the “same or similar character” under Rule 8(a). Id. 
 82 22 F3d 126 (7th Cir 1994). 
 83 Id at 128. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See id at 134. 
 86 Coleman, 22 F3d at 133. 
 87 Id at 133 (refuting the Eighth Circuit’s emphasis on both evidentiary similarities 
and time separation). 
 88 Id at 133 n 10. 
 89 Id, citing Werner, 620 F2d at 926–27. The Coleman court did not provide much 
detail on its understanding of “like class” or “correspondence in type.” But it relied on 
Second Circuit precedent for its categorical approach, which in turn pointed to a diction-
ary definition of “similar” to guide an interpretation of the same-or-similar-character 
prong: “Nearly corresponding; resembling in many respects; somewhat alike; having a 
general likeness.” Werner, 620 F2d at 926 (alteration omitted). However, it is doubtful 
whether this definition provides much clarity to lower courts deciding whether two of-
fenses are of like class. 
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months apart are offenses of same or similar character; pos-
sessing five kilograms of cocaine and defrauding a bank, even if 
they occur on the same day, are not.”90 
The Coleman court recognized the dangers inherent in its 
new categorical approach. Compared to joined offenses arising 
from “a common scheme or plan” or “the same act or transac-
tion,”91 “[t]here is no comparable saving of trial time when of-
fenses . . . related only by being of the same type are joined, 
since the offenses are usually proven by different bodies of evi-
dence.”92 Moreover, “when totally unrelated, similar offenses are 
joined, [the] defendant faces a ‘considerable risk’ of prejudice” 
that arises from “possible jury confusion [or] illegitimate cumu-
lation of evidence.”93 
Nevertheless, the Coleman court cited the respective roles of 
Rules 8(a) and 14 to justify its categorical approach. Because the 
district court’s joinder decision under Rule 8(a) is based solely on 
the face of the indictment and made at the start of the criminal 
proceeding, an “uncomplicated inquiry and review” is neces-
sary.94 At that early juncture, Coleman explained, the extent of 
evidentiary or temporal overlap between the alleged offenses 
might not be entirely clear, which supports a broad construction 
of the same-or-similar-character prong.95 Besides, any concerns 
about the unfairness created by a permissive reading of 
Rule 8(a) could be mitigated by later opportunities for severance 
under Rule 14, which provides flexible authority “for monitoring 
the continued appropriateness of a joint trial as proceedings go 
forward.”96 On a motion to sever under Rule 14, the district-
court judge may be in a better position to examine “the nature of 
the evidence and ties between the acts underlying the offenses 
charged,” and more easily weigh the “actual risk of unfair preju-
dice that a joint trial would entail.”97 
To compensate for its highly inclusive same-or-similar-
character test, the Coleman court refined its standards for 
Rule 14 severance. Departing from the “extremely difficult bur-
den” traditionally imposed on defendants to show substantial 
 
 90 Coleman, 22 F3d at 133. 
 91 FRCrP 8(a). 
 92 Coleman, 22 F3d at 133–34 & n 9. 
 93 Id at 134. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See id at 134. 
 96 Coleman, 22 F3d at 134. 
 97 Id. 
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prejudice,98 Coleman directed that district-court judges “must 
not shirk their duties under Rule 14”: they must “vigilantly 
monitor for developing unfairness” and “not hesitate to order 
severance at any point . . . if the risk of real prejudice grows too 
large to justify whatever efficiencies a joint trial does provide.”99 
The court recognized that, from the start, this balancing might 
weigh in favor of severance when offenses of the “same or simi-
lar character” are joined. To head off such cases, the court im-
plored district courts to be “especially watchful” for the devel-
opment of prejudice against the defendant, including “jury 
confusion, illegitimate cumulation of evidence or other sources of 
prejudice not worth the reduced efficiency gains of a joint tri-
al.”100 Finally, Coleman emphasized that trial courts have discre-
tion to sever under Rule 14, “not to signal any general disap-
proval of severance,” but rather to reflect the district court’s 
unique vantage point at trial.101 At the same time, the Seventh 
Circuit observed that most Rule 14 decisions that it reviews are 
denials to sever, suggesting that courts rarely take advantage of 
their Rule 14 discretion.102 
B. The Holistic Approach 
The First,103 Third,104 Fourth,105 Fifth,106 Eighth,107 and 
Ninth108 Circuits employ a holistic approach to Rule 8(a)’s 
 
 98 United States v Moya-Gomez, 860 F2d 706, 754 (7th Cir 1988). 
 99 Coleman, 22 F3d at 134. At least one other categorical circuit employs a compa-
rable balancing test when defendants seek to sever offenses of the “same or similar char-
acter” under Rule 14. See United States v Page, 657 F3d 126, 129 (2d Cir 2011) (“‘[A] de-
fendant seeking severance must show that the prejudice . . . from joinder is sufficiently 
severe to outweigh the judicial economy that would be realized by avoiding multiple 
lengthy trials.’”), quoting United States v Walker, 142 F3d 103, 110 (2d Cir 1998). 
 100 Coleman, 22 F3d at 134. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. See also Part I.B.2.b (discussing the weaknesses of Rule 14). 
 103 See United States v Edgar, 82 F3d 499, 503 (1st Cir 1996) (considering “whether 
the charges are laid under the same statute, whether they involve similar victims, loca-
tions, or modes of operation, and the time frame in which the charged conduct occurred” 
in determining whether offenses were of the “same or similar character”) (quotation 
marks omitted). See also United States v Randazzo, 80 F3d 623, 628 (1st Cir 1996) (hold-
ing that “the extent of common evidence” between counts “plays a role in implementing 
Rule 8(a)”). 
 104 See United States v Fattah, 858 F3d 801, 819 (3d Cir 2017); United States v 
Thomas, 610 F2d 1166, 1169 (3d Cir 1979) (concluding that thirty-one charges of misap-
plication of bank funds were of the “same or similar character” because the defendant 
“used his position as bank president to . . . misappropriate bank funds” and because “the 
various counts involved transactions that all occurred within an eighteen-month period 
of time”). 
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same-or-similar-character prong. These circuits refuse to permit 
joinder unless the offenses have some logical connection beyond 
a generic similarity in type or class. Although there is some di-
versity in the factors these courts use to determine whether 
charges are of the “same or similar character,” nearly all consid-
er whether the charges joined involve common evidence and 
whether the offenses were allegedly committed close in time. 
Holistic-approach courts have identified two primary justifi-
cations for adopting their respective rules. First, they cite the 
controversy surrounding the same-or-similar-character prong, 
recognizing that it might not advance joinder’s efficiency justifi-
cations while also amplifying the risk of unfair prejudice. Sec-
ond, they believe a holistic approach better reflects the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of Rules 8(a) and 14 to ensure joinder 
is available when efficient and fair. 
The Ninth Circuit has offered a uniquely developed argu-
ment for adopting a holistic rule. In United States v Jawara,109 it 
recognized that Rule 8(a) is “phrased in general terms,” but cau-
tioned it is not “infinitely elastic.”110 The court criticized the 
Seventh Circuit’s categorical rule as offering “little guidance in 
close cases” as “offenses of a ‘like class’ might encompass a host 
of otherwise unrelated offenses.”111 Instead, the Ninth Circuit 
provided six separate factors to determine from the indictment 
whether offenses joined are of the “same or similar character.”112 
In addition to ensuring that offenses are of “like class,” the court 
explained, it is “appropriate to consider factors such as the 
 
 105 See United States v Hawkins, 776 F3d 200, 209 (4th Cir 2009) (deciding that a 
carjacking charge and a felon-in-possession charge were not of the “same or similar 
character” because, “[w]hile the offenses all involved firearms, albeit different firearms, 
nothing ties them together except the defendant. There are no additional factors which 
indicate the offenses were ‘identical or strikingly similar’”). 
 106 See United States v Holloway, 1 F3d 307, 310–11 (5th Cir 1993) (relying on the 
facts that the two joined offenses were committed almost two months apart and that dif-
ferent weapons were used during the commission of the two offenses to conclude the of-
fenses were not of the “same or similar character”). 
 107 See United States v Rodgers, 732 F2d 625, 629 (8th Cir 1984) (holding that “[i]n 
applying the ‘same or similar character’ standard, [the] court has allowed the offenses to 
be joined when the two counts refer to the same type of offenses occurring over a rela-
tively short period of time, and the evidence as to each count overlaps”) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 108 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 574. 
 109 462 F3d 1173 (9th Cir 2006), amended, 474 F3d 565 (9th Cir 2007). 
 110 Id at 573–74, citing Randazzo, 80 F3d at 627, and United States v Cardwell, 433 
F3d 378, 385 (4th Cir 2005). 
 111 Jawara, 474 F3d at 577. 
 112 Id at 578. 
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elements of the statutory offenses, the temporal proximity of the 
acts, the likelihood and extent of evidentiary overlap, the 
physical location of the acts, the modus operandi of the crimes, 
and the identity of the victims.”113 
Though the Jawara court agreed with Coleman that the 
joinder inquiry under Rule 8(a) is necessarily more limited in 
scope than under Rule 14, it cautioned that “Rule 14 should not 
be viewed as a backstop or substitute for the initial analysis re-
quired under Rule 8(a).”114 The Ninth Circuit recognized that its 
exacting requirements for obtaining Rule 14 severance, together 
with the deferential standard by which it reviews district courts’ 
Rule 14 decisions, make the rule an inherently weak defense 
against any resulting prejudice.115 
Ultimately, the Jawara court decided that the joined charg-
es at issue were not of the “same or similar character.” The 
Government had charged the defendant with “document fraud 
related to his personal asylum application and conspiracy to 
commit marriage fraud to avoid the immigration laws.”116 Apply-
ing its six-factor test, the court explained that the charges 
arose under “two different statutory violations requiring proof 
of different elements” and from distinct acts “separated by 
three-and-a-half years.”117 Additionally, the indictment evinced 
neither an “evidentiary link” nor a “similar mode of operation” 
between the crimes, and the crimes did not share geographic 
locations or victims.118 
* * * 
After Coleman and Jawara, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
are split not only over the meaning of Rule 8(a)’s same-or-
similar-character prong but also over the standard for severing 
offenses under Rule 14. The Coleman court provided a categori-
cal approach to the same-or-similar-character prong. This allows 
for more instances of joinder under Rule 8(a) because the gov-
ernment must meet fewer requirements to join offenses in a sin-
gle indictment—there is no need to show the offenses are linked 
by time or evidence, have similar modi operandi or victims, or 
 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id at 573. 
 115 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 577–78. 
 116 Id at 569. 
 117 Id at 578. 
 118 Id at 579. 
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even involve similar statutory elements. To compensate, 
Coleman announced a softer standard for Rule 14 that requires 
district courts to sever offenses when the potential for unfair 
prejudice outweighs any efficiency gains. In contrast, the Ninth 
Circuit in Jawara adopted a holistic approach to the same-or-
similar-character prong, making it more difficult for the gov-
ernment to join offenses in the first place under Rule 8(a) while 
preserving its requirement that defendants show “manifest 
prejudice” before a district court may sever under Rule 14.119 The 
two courts therefore employed different strategies toward the 
same goal: allowing joinder when justified by efficiencies while 
minimizing unfair prejudice to defendants. 
C. The Same-or-Similar-Character Prong in Practice 
More than twenty years have passed since the Seventh 
Circuit decided Coleman and more than ten years since the 
Ninth Circuit decided Jawara. Having set out the rules govern-
ing joinder and severance from those decisions, this Section de-
tails how their disparate approaches to the same-or-similar-
character prong have subsequently unfolded.120 The differences 
between the holistic and categorical approaches are clearest in 
cases in which the charges joined are categorically similar but 
differ in other important ways, such as when they arise from 
completely separate conduct or involve no temporal or eviden-
tiary overlap. The following case studies demonstrate that it is 
generally easier to find offenses of the “same or similar charac-
ter” under the Seventh Circuit’s categorical “same class” test 
 
 119 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 579, citing United States v Lewis, 787 F2d 1318, 1321 
(9th Cir 1986). 
 120 I used Bloomberg Law to search the dockets of each district court within the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits using the search terms “Rule 8,” “Rule 14,” and “sever,” lim-
iting the results to criminal cases decided since September 2006, when the Ninth Circuit 
decided Jawara. I reviewed the docket of each case to determine whether either the de-
fendant or the government filed motions contending that the offenses were or were not 
properly joined under Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong, or whether the court 
decided the offenses had been properly or improperly joined under that prong. For each 
of these cases, I analyzed the court’s ruling on the defendant’s motions to sever to deter-
mine the final resolution of the issue. This research method finds only cases in which a 
motion was filed on this issue or the court’s ruling was memorialized in a written order. 
It does not find cases in which the issue of joinder was raised orally and the ruling was 
not memorialized in any kind of written order. For the cases located by the search meth-
od, see Appendix. 
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compared to the Ninth Circuit’s holistic six-factor approach.121 
Yet although the holistic and categorical rules often lead to dif-
ferent outcomes, both require that courts sever categorically dis-
tinct charges. 
Since September 2006, twenty-two district-court cases in 
the Seventh Circuit have considered whether offenses were 
properly joined under the same-or-similar-character prong. Of 
these, courts found the offenses were misjoined in seven cases. 
These courts relied on Rule 8(a) to sever categorically distinct 
charges, including drug distribution and firearms offenses,122 fel-
on in possession of a firearm and witness intimidation,123 failure 
to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 
Act124 and attempting to coerce a minor to engage in sexual ac-
tivity,125 drug distribution and murder for hire,126 and possession 
of child pornography and felon in possession of a firearm.127 
In the remaining fifteen cases in which the district courts of 
the Seventh Circuit denied Rule 8(a) severance motions, the 
courts found the charges to be of “like class,” and thus properly 
joined under the same-or-similar-character prong. These courts 
permitted joinder even without evidentiary or temporal overlap 
between the alleged offenses. In one example, a district court de-
termined a pension plan embezzlement charge and bank fraud 
charges were of “similar character,” even though the charges 
shared no overlapping evidence and arose from separate conduct 
 
 121 To compare the outcomes in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, I chose to focus on 
the qualitative aspects of the individual district-court cases rather than the number of 
times that courts deny defendants’ motions to sever under Rule 8(a). Not only are there 
issues with drawing statistical inferences from small sample sizes, but the circuits’ es-
tablished joinder rules might influence the decision to bring a Rule 8(a) motion in the 
first place. In particular, defendants charged within the Seventh Circuit might decide to 
forgo a Rule 8(a) motion because the joined charges are clearly of “like class” under 
Coleman, even if they share no temporal or evidentiary similarity. These defendants 
might instead focus their resources on arguing for severance under Rule 14, thus de-
creasing the number of denials of Rule 8(a) motions within the Seventh Circuit. See, for 
example, United States v Rollins, 301 F3d 511, 517 (7th Cir 2002). 
 122 See Order, United States v Broadway, Criminal Action No 12-124, *1 (ND Ind 
filed Mar 8, 2013). 
 123 See Decision and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Sever, United States v 
Salinas, Criminal Action No 09-185, *1 (ED Wis filed Sept 25, 2009). 
 124 Pub L No 109-248, 120 Stat 590 (2006), codified at 42 USC §§ 16901–17. 
 125 See Decision and Order on Defendant’s Pretrial Motion to Sever Counts, United 
States v Williams, Criminal Action No 14-109, *1 (ED Wis filed May 5, 2015). 
 126 See Decision and Order on Defendant’s Pretrial Motion to Sever Count Eleven, 
United States v Ponce De Leon, Criminal Action No 14-197, *1 (ED Wis filed Apr 29, 2015). 
 127 See Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Sever, United States v 
Schneider, Criminal Action No 07-041, *1 (ED Wis filed June 12, 2007). 
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fourteen months apart.128 Another court decided that filing a 
false tax return and tax evasion were of the “same or similar 
character” despite the lack of any temporal or evidentiary rela-
tion between the offenses.129 
During the same time period, thirty-two district-court cases 
in the Ninth Circuit employed the Jawara factors to determine 
whether offenses were properly joined under the same-or-
similar-character prong. Courts granted Rule 8(a) motions to 
sever in twelve cases. As in the Seventh Circuit, these courts 
easily severed categorically distinct charges, such as conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute narcotics charges from mon-
ey laundering charges130 and a felon-in-possession charge from 
securities fraud and identity theft charges.131 
These district courts also severed charges under Rule 8(a) 
that could arguably be considered of “like class” per Coleman 
but were not sufficiently similar under Jawara. For example, a 
district court severed two robbery charges despite similar statu-
tory elements, victims, and modi operandi, because they arose 
from two separate incidents occurring nearly three years 
apart.132 Another court severed chemical weapons charges from 
explosive device charges because they derived from incidents 
separated by twenty-one months, involved different explosive 
mechanisms, and did not share similar victims.133 Likewise, a 
court found that various fraud charges were misjoined under 
Rule 8(a) as they related to two distinct schemes involving dif-
ferent victims and no evidentiary overlap.134 And while both 
schemes resulted in mail and wire fraud charges, only one re-
sulted in additional charges of money laundering and 
 
 128 See Order, United States v Peterson, Criminal Action No 12-087, *2–3 (WD Wis 
filed Mar 5, 2014) (“Peterson Order”). 
 129 See Opinion, United States v Fogerson, Criminal Action No 13-20047, *6–7 (CD 
Ill filed May 14, 2014) (applying Coleman to decide the charges were “of like class,” be-
cause they were “financial crimes involving defrauding the IRS”). 
 130 See Notice of Motion and Motion for Severance Pursuant to F.R.Crim.P.8(a); 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, United States v Grudzien, 
Criminal Action No 13-059, *1, 3 (ND Cal filed Aug 28, 2014). 
 131 See Final Report and Recommendation regarding Defendant’s Motion to Sev-
er Counts, United States v Freriks, Criminal Action No 10-106, *1–3, 8 (D Alaska 
filed Apr 11, 2011). 
 132 See Order, United States v Kincade, Criminal Action No 15-071, *1–2 (D Nev 
filed Oct 21, 2016). 
 133 See Report and Recommendations, United States v Fries, Criminal Action No 11-
1751, *2 (D Ariz filed Aug 27, 2012). 
 134 See Order, United States v Sarad, Criminal Action No 11-387, *1–2 (ED Cal 
filed Feb 4, 2014). 
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transacting in criminally derived property.135 That the elements 
of these latter charges differed from those of mail and wire fraud 
“weigh[ed] in favor of finding the joinder improper.”136 
In the remaining twenty cases, the district courts of the 
Ninth Circuit decided that the joined charges were of the “same 
or similar character” under Jawara. Charges of transporting a 
minor to engage in prostitution, sex trafficking of children, and 
enticement of a minor were properly joined, for example, be-
cause the evidence of each offense overlapped, they allegedly oc-
curred during the same time period, in the same location, and 
involved similar victims.137 Likewise, a district court decided 
that bank fraud charges could be joined with charges of willful 
misapplication of bank funds.138 Although the charges arose from 
separate conduct, the court nonetheless determined that they 
were of “similar character”: they involved the same victim, had a 
similar modus operandi, and shared overlapping evidence.139 
These case studies demonstrate that the divergent ap-
proaches taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits result in real 
differences in the outcomes of Rule 8(a) severance motions. 
While the Coleman and Jawara courts attempted to honor the 
same balance between efficiency and fairness, courts in the 
Ninth Circuit generally analyze the nexus between the charged 
offenses more rigorously under the same-or-similar-character 
prong. These courts ask questions aimed at ensuring that join-
der can generate real efficiencies for the system while also min-
imizing the risk of unjustified prejudice toward the defendant. 
In contrast, the district courts of the Seventh Circuit decide 
merely whether the charges are of “like class” under Rule 8(a), 
leaving any balancing of efficiency against fairness for another 
day on a motion to sever under Rule 14. 
D. Rule 14 Severance in Practice 
The Seventh Circuit in Coleman recognized that its permis-
sive joinder rule risked greater prejudice unjustified by any ex-
tra efficiency. To avoid this danger, Coleman implored district 
 
 135 Id at *4. 
 136 Id at *6. 
 137 See Omnibus Order on Pretrial Motions, United States v Powell, Criminal Action 
No 15-244, *15–16 (WD Wash filed Feb 10, 2016). 
 138 See Memorandum Decision and Order, United States v Teall, Criminal Action No 
14-119, *15 (D Idaho filed June 29, 2015). 
 139 See id. 
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courts to “not hesitate to order severance” under Rule 14 “if the 
risk of real prejudice grows too large to justify whatever 
efficiencies a joint trial does provide.”140 The Seventh Circuit 
placed its trust in Rule 14 to protect defendants from unjustified 
prejudice. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Jawara cited 
Rule 14’s procedural and practical difficulties to reinforce its ho-
listic approach to the same-or-similar-character prong.141 
Jawara relied on an exhaustive Rule 8(a) analysis to reduce 
joinder’s risk of unjustified prejudice and therefore kept intact 
its high bar for obtaining Rule 14 severance.142 
Ever since, the Ninth Circuit and its district courts have 
continued applying an exacting standard for Rule 14 severance, 
requiring that defendants show “manifest prejudice.”143 The 
Seventh Circuit and its district courts, however, have not been 
so consistent. In the immediate wake of Coleman, the Seventh 
Circuit continued to apply Coleman’s modified approach to 
Rule 14, recognizing that “the risk of unfairness is elevated in a 
trial where the joinder of two or more offenses is predicated on 
their ‘same or similar character.’”144 Just a few years later, 
though, the wheels began to fall off. In United States v Rollins,145 
the defendant was charged with four robbery counts connected 
to four separate incidents.146 Though the defendant conceded 
that the charges were “of same or similar character” under the 
Seventh Circuit’s categorical approach, he argued for Rule 14 
severance.147 While Rollins acknowledged Rule 14 tasks the dis-
trict court with “balancing the cost of multiple trials against the 
possible prejudice inherent in a single trial,” the court failed to 
recognize, as Coleman did, that this balancing should be skewed 
 
 140 Coleman, 22 F3d at 134. 
 141 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 573. 
 142 See id at 579. 
 143 See, for example, Order, United States v Tapaha, Criminal Action No 12-8177, *2 
(D Ariz filed Jan 8, 2014) (“Rule 14 sets a high standard for showing prejudice. . . . 
Defendant bears the burden of showing clear, manifest, or undue prejudice of such a 
magnitude that, without severance, he will be denied a fair trial.”), citing United States v 
Throckmorton, 87 F3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir 1996); Order, United States v Damante, Crim-
inal Action No 11-064, *4 (D Nev filed Sep 8, 2011) (“To prevail on a motion for severance 
based on prejudicial joinder, the defendant must demonstrate that without severance he 
is unable to receive a fair trial, and that he will suffer actual, compelling prejudice.”); 
United States v Mitchell, 502 F3d 931, 963 (9th Cir 2007). 
 144 United States v Turner, 93 F3d 276, 284 (7th Cir 1996). 
 145 301 F3d 511 (7th Cir 2002). 
 146 Id at 513. 
 147 See id at 517. 
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in favor of severance when offenses of the “same or similar char-
acter” are joined.148 
Set in motion by Rollins, the Seventh Circuit’s reversion to 
its exacting pre-Coleman Rule 14 standard continued in United 
States v Berg,149 which involved the joinder of marijuana and co-
caine trafficking charges under the same-or-similar-character 
prong.150 There, the court again ignored Coleman’s warning that 
the risks of categorical joinder may not be justified by its effi-
ciencies. Instead, Berg relied on a different Seventh Circuit case 
not involving the same-or-similar-character prong when it sum-
marily dismissed the defendant’s unfair prejudice arguments.151 
“[W]hatever the source of the purported prejudice,” the Berg 
court explained, “the defendant bears a heavy burden” of estab-
lishing that “denial of severance actually prejudiced him by pre-
venting the jury from arriving at a reliable judgment as to guilt 
or innocence.”152 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit has ignored 
Coleman’s modification to the Rule 14 standard in cases in 
which offenses are categorically joined under the same-or-
similar-character prong, and has instead continued imposing a 
“heavy burden” on defendants to show substantial prejudice.153 
Unsurprisingly, the Seventh Circuit’s confusion in this area 
has led to great inconsistencies at the district-court level. Since 
Coleman, there have been nine written orders by district courts 
of the Seventh Circuit regarding severing under Rule 14 offenses 
categorically joined by the same-or-similar-character prong. 
Four of these failed to apply Coleman’s balancing modification. 
These courts instead employed the stringent pre-Coleman test 
for severance without considering whether joinder was truly jus-
tified by efficiency.154 
 
 148 Id at 518. 
 149 714 F3d 490 (7th Cir 2013). 
 150 See id at 493–94. 
 151 See id at 496, citing United States v Ervin, 540 F3d 623, 629 (7th Cir 2008). 
Ervin dealt with joinder under Rule 8(a)’s “common scheme or plan” prong, which typi-
cally involves substantial evidentiary and temporal overlap because the joined offenses 
must be “connected.” Ervin, 540 F3d at 628. See also United States v Davis, 724 F3d 949, 
955 (7th Cir 2013). As a result, joinder in these cases more often satisfies its efficiency 
purpose and reduces the risk of unfair prejudice. 
 152 Berg, 714 F3d at 496, quoting Ervin, 540 F3d at 629. 
 153 See United States v Peterson, 823 F3d 1113, 1124 (7th Cir 2016) (“[T]he defend-
ant must demonstrate actual prejudice by showing that he was unable to obtain a fair 
trial.”), citing Ervin, 540 F3d at 629. 
 154 See Order, United States v Lipford, Criminal Action No 15-167, *3 (ED Wis filed 
Feb 22, 2016); Order, United States v Bradford, Criminal Action No 15-30001, *9–10 (SD 
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In United States v Peterson,155 for example, the Government 
charged the defendant in the Western District of Wisconsin with 
twelve counts relating to a bank fraud scheme from December 
2007: the defendant, the Government alleged, lied to banks to 
obtain money in violation of 18 USC §§ 1344 and 1014, and de-
posited money derived from unlawful activity in violation of 18 
USC § 1957.156 Count thirteen of the indictment charged the de-
fendant with violating 18 USC § 664 by unlawfully extracting 
money from an employee pension fund in February 2009.157 The 
district court first decided that, pursuant to Coleman, the thir-
teen charges were properly joined under the same-or-similar-
character prong as each involved the defendant’s “use [of] his 
business ventures to obtain money by dishonest means.”158 The 
defendant argued, however, that count thirteen should be sev-
ered under Rule 14 because the alleged crimes occurred nearly 
fourteen months apart and involved different evidence.159 Fur-
thermore, the jury likely would confuse the evidence and be 
“more apt to be swayed by the testimony of real people who have 
lost their retirement benefits than . . . by impersonal banks that 
lost funds.”160 The court denied the Rule 14 severance motion, 
explaining only that “[w]ith appropriate instructions, the jury 
can be trusted to decide defendant’s guilt or innocence inde-
pendently on each count.”161 The court neglected to consider any 
efficiencies created by joining the offenses or to weigh those 
against the risks of prejudice. 
In contrast, the remaining five district-court cases applied 
Coleman’s refinement of Rule 14 by balancing the efficiencies 
gained by joinder against the prejudice posed to the defendant. 
In United States v Barker,162 for example, the Government 
charged the defendant with two sets of two charges: armed bank 
robbery and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence.163 
 
Ill filed June 26, 2015); Peterson Order at *3 (cited in note 128); Statement, United 
States v Abarca, Criminal Action No 06-575, *1 (ND Ill filed Mar 16, 2007). 
 155 Peterson Order (cited in note 128). 
 156 Id at *1. 
 157 Id at *1–2. 
 158 Id at *1. 
 159 Peterson Order at *2–3 (cited in note 128). 
 160 Id at *3. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Order on Defendant’s Motion for Severance and Separate Trials of Counts 1 and 
2 from Counts 3 and 4, United States v Barker, Criminal Action No 09-112 (ED Wis filed 
July 21, 2009) (“Barker Order”). 
 163 See id at *1. 
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The first set stemmed from an alleged bank robbery in May 
2006.164 The second arose from the robbery of a different bank in 
a different city in February 2008.165 The district court decided to 
sever the two sets of charges under Rule 14 because it found 
their joinder “so prejudicial that it outweighs the interests of ju-
dicial economy and efficiency.”166 Specifically, “the cumulative ef-
fect of hearing the evidence of the defendant’s alleged role in 
both bank robberies would be highly prejudicial to the defendant 
if both robberies were tried together.”167 And because the evi-
dence proffered in support of each robbery did not overlap, “the 
efficiency lost by trying the cases separately would be nominal 
when compared with the prejudice to the defendant if the cases 
were tried together.”168 
Based on these observations, it is clear that court decisions 
are affected by which Rule 14 standard they employ; district 
courts using the Coleman balancing approach to Rule 14 were 
more likely to sever offenses than courts applying the more ex-
acting pre-Coleman standard. Of the five district courts to apply 
Coleman’s refinement, two decided that the risk of unfair preju-
dice was not justified by the efficiencies of a joint trial and sev-
ered the charges.169 In the other three cases, the courts found the 
defendant had failed to show that prejudice outweighed the effi-
ciencies of a joint trial and, consequently, declined to sever un-
der Rule 14.170 In contrast, each of the four district courts apply-
ing the stringent pre-Coleman Rule 14 standard denied 
severance. 
This difference in outcome may boil down to the mindset of 
the judge analyzing the Rule 14 issue. Merely framing the sev-
erance question as “Has the defendant shown enough prejudice 
to warrant severance?” rather than “Is joinder’s prejudice justi-
fied by any efficiency gains?” might cause courts to sever offens-
es less frequently in similar cases. And because the Seventh 
 
 164 See id at *2. 
 165 See id at *2–3. 
 166 Barker Order at *5 (cited in note 162). 
 167 Id at *6. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See Notification of Docket Entry, United States v Zamiar, Criminal Action No 
13-929, *1 (ND Ill filed Nov 26, 2014); Barker Order at *5–9 (cited in note 162). 
 170 See Opinion, United States v Fifer, Criminal Action No 14-30006, *19–23 (CD Ill 
filed Oct 23, 2015); Statement, United States v Simmons, Criminal Action No 10-820, *2–
3 (ND Ill filed June 28, 2012); Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States v 
Kashmiri, Criminal Action No 09-830, *2–4 (ND Ill filed June 7, 2012). 
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Circuit and its district courts invariably apply the permissive 
categorical approach to the same-or-similar-character prong, 
they violate not only the careful balance struck by Coleman but 
also the principles of Pointer and McElroy that rulemakers ex-
plicitly baked into Rules 8(a) and 14. 
III.  A HOLISTIC SOLUTION TO THE SAME-OR-SIMILAR-CHARACTER 
PRONG 
Rules 8(a) and 14, according to their drafters, substantially 
restate the law on joinder in place before their adoption in 
1944.171 At that time, 18 USC § 557 governed the joinder of of-
fenses. As the Supreme Court established in Pointer and 
McElroy, that statute incorporated “settled principles of crimi-
nal law,” including a general presumption against joinder in 
federal prosecutions.172 Pointer recognized joinder’s great risk of 
prejudice toward defendants and advised that even when joinder 
is appropriate, courts “must not permit the defendant to be em-
barrassed in his defence.”173 Later, in McElroy, the Court 
acknowledged that joinder “has been considered so objectionable 
as tending to confound the accused in his defence, or to prejudice 
him as . . . being held out to be habitually criminal, in the dis-
traction . . . of the jury.”174 To mitigate these risks, McElroy ex-
plained that courts should not allow joint trials on offenses “sep-
arate and distinct, complete in themselves and independent of 
each other, committed at different times and not provable by the 
same evidence.”175 
Because Rules 8(a) and 14 have not changed since 1944, the 
principles of Pointer and McElroy should continue directing 
courts’ joinder and severance inquiries today.176 Courts applying 
the rules must be mindful that joining offenses of the “same or 
similar character” might prove unfairly prejudicial to defend-
ants, especially when the offenses derive from entirely distinct 
conduct with little evidentiary and temporal overlap. Courts 
should understand, too, that in these cases the efficiency justifi-
cations for joinder are often weaker and might not be sufficiently 
 
 171 FRCrP 8(a), Advisory Committee Note to the 1944 Rule. 
 172 Pointer, 151 US at 400. See also McElroy, 164 US at 80, quoting Pointer, 151 
US at 400. 
 173 Pointer, 151 US at 403. 
 174 McElroy, 164 US at 80. 
 175 Id at 79–80. 
 176 See note 47 and accompanying text. 
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compelling to justify the heightened risk of prejudice. To this 
end, courts should apply Rules 8(a) and 14 by balancing joinder’s 
advantages and disadvantages while keeping in mind the rela-
tive strengths and limitations of the two rules in protecting 
against unjustified prejudice. 
The reverberations of Pointer’s and McElroy’s admonitions 
were heard in both Coleman and Jawara. The Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits recognized the dangers of joining offenses under 
the same-or-similar-character prong and established two diver-
gent systems to account for its inherent problems. By adjusting 
their respective standards under Rules 8(a) and 14, the two 
courts sought to ensure charges are joined only when doing so is 
efficient and fair. 
The Seventh Circuit adopted a categorical approach to the 
same-or-similar-character prong but recognized that this might 
prejudice defendants without a concomitant increase in efficien-
cy. Thus, Coleman announced a more lenient standard for sev-
erance under Rule 14, requiring lower courts to sever offenses 
when joinder’s costs outweigh its benefits. It attempted to strike 
a careful balance between efficiency and fairness by making 
Rule 14 severance more accessible in response to its permissive 
joinder standard for Rule 8(a). 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit in Jawara announced a holis-
tic approach to the same-or-similar-character prong and re-
quired lower courts to apply six separate factors before allowing 
joinder. Satisfied with this approach’s fairness, which restricts 
the government’s ability to join offenses from the start, the 
Ninth Circuit left in place its exacting requirement that defend-
ants seeking Rule 14 severance show “manifest prejudice” from 
the joinder.177 
As the case studies in Parts II.C and II.D show, Coleman’s 
attempt to create an efficient and fair system of joinder has 
failed. The Seventh Circuit’s categorical approach allows more 
combinations of offenses joined under the same-or-similar-
character prong compared to the holistic approach.178 This dif-
ference is most apparent when the government joins similar 
statutory charges in a single indictment but the underlying 
crimes share few other similarities, whether in evidence, time, 
location, modus operandi, or victim. In fact, under the 
 
 177 See Jawara, 474 F3d at 579, citing United States v Lewis, 787 F2d 1318, 1321 
(9th Cir 1986). 
 178 See Part II.C. 
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categorical approach, even violations of entirely different stat-
utes can be joined depending on the level of abstraction taken by 
the court in judging the similarities between the offenses.179 
Critically, the Seventh Circuit’s approach does not always 
advance joinder’s traditional justifications of judicial and prose-
cutorial economy. When categorically joined charges are proven 
with different bodies of evidence and separate witnesses, the 
time and resources saved by a joint trial are less obvious. At the 
same time, categorical joinder comes with far greater risks of 
unfair prejudice toward the defendant. In these cases, jurors see 
and hear evidence relating to the multiple charges. If strong ev-
idence supports an inference of guilt on one charge, the jury 
might be inclined to look past weaker evidence on the other 
charges, inferring that if the defendant is guilty of one crime, he 
is also guilty of the others. The defendant might be prejudiced, 
too, simply by having multiple charges against him. The jury 
could conclude the defendant has a criminal character or pro-
pensity to commit crime, an inference against which the Federal 
Rules of Evidence protect.180 
The Seventh Circuit’s trust in Rule 14 has also proven mis-
guided. Coleman pointed to the availability of Rule 14 severance 
to justify its permissive understanding of the same-or-similar-
character prong. The court believed that Rule 14 could function 
as a safety valve, authorizing severance in the face of unjustified 
prejudice. Yet Coleman’s ideal of trial judges severing offenses 
whenever the risk of prejudice outweighs joinder’s efficiency 
benefits has not materialized, which is perhaps inevitable given 
Rule 14’s inherent weaknesses.181 Not only have district courts 
inconsistently applied Coleman’s lower standard for severance, 
the Seventh Circuit itself has reverted to imposing a greater bur-
den on defendants petitioning under Rule 14.182 In turn, this leads 
courts to sever fewer offenses, even when the defendant can point 
to concrete examples of joinder’s prejudice.183 Thus, by 
 
 179 See, for example, Peterson Order at *1 (cited in note 128) (deciding that charged 
violations of 18 USC §§ 664, 1014, 1344, and 1957 were of “similar character,” as each 
involved the defendant’s “use [of] his business ventures to obtain money by dishonest 
means”). 
 180 See FRE 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to 
prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted 
in accordance with the character.”). 
 181 See Part II.D. See also Part I.B.2.b. 
 182 See Part II.D. 
 183 See Part II.D. 
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permissively joining charges under the same-or-similar-character 
prong while raising higher barriers to Rule 14 severance, ap-
proaches like the Seventh Circuit’s virtually ensure that there 
will be instances in which joinder creates substantial prejudice 
with little or no efficiency gains. 
To remedy these problems and avoid the Seventh Circuit’s 
failures, categorical-approach courts should instead employ a 
holistic approach to the same-or-similar-character prong by re-
quiring that joined offenses be connected by at least evidence 
and time. This solution conforms to the drafters’ characteriza-
tion of Rules 8(a) and 14 as “substantially a restatement of ex-
isting law,”184 as well as the Supreme Court’s prohibition on the 
joinder of offenses “committed at different times, and not prova-
ble by the same evidence.”185 Furthermore, Rule 8(a)’s drafters 
purposely replaced the “same class of crimes”186 language from 
the former joinder statute with the phrase “same or similar 
character” so that courts focus on the nature of the offenses 
joined rather than their degree or grading as either misdemean-
or or felony.187 If the Court in Pointer and McElroy believed that 
the 1853 statute’s “same class of crimes” language required of-
fenses be connected by time and evidence, then surely the same-
or-similar-character prong demands at least as much. 
The holistic approach comports with this understanding by 
permitting joinder only when the offenses are at least related in 
time and by evidence.188 This better reflects the general pre-
sumption against joinder embodied in Rules 8(a) and 14 and ful-
fills the principles of Pointer and McElroy by reducing the risk 
that defendants will suffer unfair and unjustified prejudice in 
criminal trials. The holistic approach also ensures that offenses 
are joined when the efficiency justifications are strongest, such 
as when evidence of the crimes overlaps, and guards against un-
fair prejudice by requiring offenses to be more closely related. 
In addition, the holistic approach’s focus on a series of fac-
tors to determine the “same or similar character” better guides 
lower courts’ application of Rule 8(a) and leads to more con-
sistent results.189 Jawara’s six factors constitute concrete 
 
 184 FRCrP 8(a), Advisory Committee Note to 1944 Rule. 
 185 McElroy, 164 US at 79–80. 
 186 Act of Feb 26, 1853, 10 Stat at 162. 
 187 See Orfield, 26 FRD at 26–27 (cited in note 55). 
 188 See Part II.B. 
 189 See Wright, et al, 1A Federal Practice & Procedure § 143 at 43 (cited in note 54). 
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requirements for joinder compared to Coleman’s ill-defined 
concept of “like class.”190 Consequently, it is easier for district 
courts to decide whether the offenses are connected by time or 
evidence without having to be concerned about the proper level 
of generality to find any thematic connection between the 
joined charges. 
What’s more, the holistic approach more closely reflects the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of Rules 8(a) and 14 to effec-
tively counter joinder’s prejudice. Because the holistic-approach 
courts employ a more rigorous application of the same-or-
similar-character prong that results in fewer combinations of 
charges joined, they need not be as concerned that Rule 8(a) 
joinder will cause unfairness. As a result, the holistic-approach 
courts are able to maintain a high standard for defendants seek-
ing to sever under Rule 14. This avoids Rule 14’s inherent 
weaknesses in protecting against unjustified prejudice, includ-
ing the broad discretion enjoyed by district-court judges apply-
ing the rule. As the experience in the Seventh Circuit 
demonstrates, even when defendants can show that joinder 
causes substantial prejudice, district courts may order alterna-
tive remedies to severance, such as imploring the jury not to 
draw impermissible inferences about the defendant’s criminal 
character.191 Likewise, the holistic approach’s relatively greater 
reliance on Rule 8(a) reduces the likelihood that the sunk-cost 
fallacy will affect the district-court judge’s decision to sever, be-
cause the Rule 8(a) joinder determination is made at the begin-
ning of the case and based solely on the indictment’s contents.192 
Compared to the categorical approach, the holistic approach 
better incorporates the principles of Pointer and McElroy embod-
ied in Rules 8(a) and 14, is more likely to allow joinder only 
when justified by real efficiency gains, and better reflects the 
comparative strengths and weaknesses of the rules in prevent-
ing unjustified prejudice against criminal defendants. The holis-
tic approach is therefore superior to the categorical alternative 
and authorizes joinder only when efficient and fair. 
 
 190 The Jawara court predicted that, depending on the level of abstraction, absurdi-
ties can result in finding obviously dissimilar offenses are of “like class.” See Jawara, 
474 F3d at 579. 
 191 See Part II.D. 
 192 See note 76 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
Joinder of offenses against a single defendant is a contro-
versial mechanism in the federal system. Especially contentious 
is joinder under Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong, as 
it may create a greater risk of unfair prejudice toward the de-
fendant without accompanying efficiency gains. It is therefore 
troubling that the federal courts are deeply split over how to de-
termine whether offenses can be joined under this prong. 
Courts taking a categorical approach to the same-or-similar-
character prong should instead employ a holistic approach. By 
permissively joining offenses under the same-or-similar-
character prong while making it difficult to later sever under 
Rule 14, the categorical-approach courts violate the Supreme 
Court precedent embodied in the federal rules. Pointer and 
McElroy instructed that joinder should be sustained only when 
offenses are connected in some tangible evidentiary way, such as 
involving the same evidence and temporal overlap, and when de-
fendants will not be unfairly prejudiced as a result. The solution 
offered here conforms to the drafters’ intent to preserve in the 
rules the principles established by Pointer and McElroy, proper-
ly accounts for the procedural and practical realities of the rules, 
and allows joinder only when justified by the efficiencies it af-
fords. This solution ensures that the joinder of similar offenses 
is available when it serves its legitimate purpose but will not 
needlessly expose criminal defendants to excessive prejudice. 
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APPENDIX 
I used Bloomberg Law to search the dockets of each district 
court within the Seventh and Ninth Circuits using the search 
terms “Rule 8,” “Rule 14,” and “sever,” limiting the results to 
criminal cases decided since September 2006, when the Ninth 
Circuit decided Jawara. I reviewed the docket of each case to de-
termine whether either the defendant or the government filed 
motions contending that the offenses were or were not properly 
joined under Rule 8(a)’s same-or-similar-character prong, or 
whether the court decided the offenses had been properly or im-
properly joined under that prong. For each of these cases, I 
analyzed the court’s ruling on the defendant’s motions to sever 
to determine the final resolution of the issue. Tables 1 and 2 
consolidate the results for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits re-
spectively. This research method finds only cases in which a mo-
tion was filed on this issue or the court’s ruling was memorial-
ized in a written order. It does not find cases in which the issue 
of joinder was raised orally and the ruling was not memorialized 
in any kind of written order. 










United States v Lipford, Criminal Action No 
15-167 (ED Wis filed Feb 22, 2016) Denied Denied 
United States v Fifer, Criminal Action No 14-
30006 (CD Ill filed Oct 23, 2015) Not raised Denied 
United States v Carpenter, Criminal Action 
No 13-930 (ND Ill filed July 30, 2015) Denied Not raised 
United States v Williams, Criminal Action No 
14-109 (ED Wis filed May 5, 2015) 
Granted N/A 
United States v Ponce De Leon, Criminal Ac-
tion No 14-197 (ED Wis filed Apr 29, 2015) Granted N/A 
United States v Bradford, Criminal Action No 
15-30001 (SD Ill filed June 26, 2015) Denied Denied 
United States v Anderson, Criminal Action 
No 14-186 (ED Wis filed Apr 29, 2015) Denied Not raised 
United States v DiCosola, Criminal Action No 
12-446 (ND Ill filed Aug 14, 2014) Denied Granted 
United States v Fogerson, Criminal Action No 
13-20047 (CD Ill filed May 14, 2014) Denied Denied 
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United States v Zamiar, Criminal Action No 
13-929 (ND Ill filed Dec 3, 2013) Denied Granted 
United States v Broadway, Criminal Action 
No 12-124 (ND Ind filed Mar 8, 2013) Granted Granted 
United States v Jenkins, Criminal Action No 
12-34 (ED Wis filed Aug 15, 2012) Granted N/A 
United States v Simmons, Criminal Action 
No 10-820 (ND Ill filed June 28, 2012) Denied Denied 
United States v Tolbert, Criminal Action No 
11-186 (ED Wis filed Feb 7, 2012) 
Denied Not raised 
United States v Kashmiri, Criminal Action 
No 09-830 (ND Ill filed Jan 25, 2011) Denied Denied 
United States v Salinas, Criminal Action No 
09-185 (ED Wis filed Sept 25, 2009) Granted N/A 
United States v Barker, Criminal Action No 
09-112 (ED Wis filed July 21, 2009) Denied Granted 
United States v Rogers, Criminal Action No 
06-540 (ND Ill filed Feb 29, 2008) Not raised Denied 
United States v Schneider, Criminal Action 
No 07-041 (ED Wis filed June 12, 2007) Granted N/A 
United States v Guillen, Criminal Action No 
06-360 (ND Ill filed May 23, 2007) 
Not raised Denied 
United States v Abarca, Criminal Action No 
06-575 (ND Ill filed Mar 16, 2007) Denied Denied 
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United States v Kincade, Criminal Action No 
15-71 (D Nev filed Oct 21, 2016) Granted N/A 
United States v King, Criminal Action No 14-
3537 (SD Cal filed Mar 14, 2016) Denied Denied 
United States v Powell, Criminal Action No 
15-244 (WD Wash filed Feb 10, 2016) Denied Denied 
United States v Kimmell, Criminal Action No 
14-54 (D Nev filed Nov 9, 2015) Denied Denied 
United States v Drago, Criminal Action No 
13-334 (D Nev filed Oct 26, 2015) Denied Denied 
United States v Handl, Criminal Action No 
15-126 (ND Cal filed Aug 25, 2015) 
Granted N/A 
United States v Teall, Criminal Action No 14-
119 (D Idaho filed June 29, 2015) Denied Denied 
United States v Tillisy, Criminal Action No 
13-310 (WD Wash filed Nov 14, 2014) Denied Denied 
United States v Grudzien, Criminal Action 
No 13-59 (ND Cal filed Aug 28, 2014) Granted N/A 
United States v Hill, Criminal Action No 13-
765 (ND Cal filed July 24, 2014) Granted N/A 
United States v Rachell, Criminal Action No 
14-25 (D Mont filed June 19, 2014) Denied Denied 
United States v Halgat, Criminal Action No 
13-239 (D Nev filed June 13, 2014) 
Granted N/A 
United States v Alcaraz, Criminal Action No 
13-189 (D Nev filed May 20, 2014) Denied Denied 
United States v Taplin, Criminal Action No 
13-266 (D Or filed Feb 10, 2014) Granted N/A 
United States v Sarad, Criminal Action No 
11-387 (ED Cal filed Feb 4, 2014) Granted N/A 
United States v Tapaha, Criminal Action No 
12-8177 (D Ariz filed Jan 8, 2014) Denied Denied 
United States v LaFarga, Criminal Action No 


















United States v Walton, Criminal Action No 
12-311 (D Nev filed Dec 6, 2013) Not raised Granted 
United States v Musso, Criminal Action No 
12-273 (D Nev filed Oct 1, 2013) 
Denied Not raised 
United States v Ruby, Criminal Action No 12-
1073 (SD Cal filed Feb 12, 2013) Denied Not raised 
United States v Vales, Criminal Action No 
11-434 (D Nev filed Jan 4, 2013) Not raised Granted 
United States v Fries, Criminal Action No 11-
1751 (D Ariz filed Aug 27, 2012) Granted N/A 
United States v Salyer, Criminal Action No 
10-61 (ED Cal filed Dec 12, 2011) Granted N/A 
United States v Quesada, Criminal Action No 
11-8088 (D Ariz filed Dec 1, 2011) Not raised Granted 
United States v Damante, Criminal Action 
No 11-64 (D Nev filed Sept 8, 2011) 
Denied Denied 
United States v Freriks, Criminal Action No 
10-106 (D Alaska filed Apr 11, 2011) Granted N/A 
United States v Walizer, Criminal Action No 
10-124 (D Nev filed Dec 30, 2010) Not raised Denied 
United States v Schmit, Criminal Action No 
07-1714 (D Ariz filed Dec 14, 2010) Denied Denied 
United States v Brown, Criminal Action No 
09-8067 (D Ariz filed July 13, 2010) Not raised Denied 
United States v Nejbauer, Criminal Action 
No 09-670 (D Ariz filed Nov 2, 2009) Not raised Denied 
United States v Cerna, Criminal Action No 
08-730 (ND Cal filed Sept 16, 2009) 
Granted N/A 
United States v Feliciano, Criminal Action 
No 08-932 (D Ariz filed Aug 5, 2009) Not raised Denied 
 
